
# NTS Firm & Interruptible Entry Capacity Discounts and Spare Capacity


Gas TCMF 11<sup>th</sup> June 2008


### Clearing Allocation Obligation

- Zero reserve price for capacity sold on the day coupled with an obligation to offer for sale the baseline level of capacity (which is sometimes above physical capability):
  - does not encourage long-term bookings;
  - does not encourage liquidity in the secondary market;
  - can result in under-recovery against the TO MAR, which leads to an increase in the TO commodity charge (payable on entry flows);
- Suggest that the obligation is removed and National Grid applies a reserve price for daily capacity as for other timeframes
- Potentially seek to price interruptible product providing opportunity for product differentiation
























## Interruptible Capacity & Secondary Market

### UIOLI

- Rationale behind the UIOLI product was as an antihoarding device;
  - Potentially still warranted today and is required to comply with EU Regulation – but only where there is contractual congestion.
  - Could it be sharpened from a charging perspective to stimulate the secondary market as the "lose it" does not bite?
  - Quantity: Is zero priced interruptible appropriate if firm still available at the ASEP or in the locality?
- Discretionary interruptible
  - Product introduced given the potential issues identified during implementation of T&T for winter 2007/8.
    - Should this be released on a risk reward basis?

# **Spare Capacity & QSEC Discounts**

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# What is Spare Capacity

- Spare System Capacity ~ Capability:
  - Un-used physical capability in an individual pipe or a sub-network i.e. series of connected pipes?

Or

- Spare Entry Capacity
  - Commercial

# **Spare System Capacity ~ Capability**


- Transcost approach
  - Leads to unstable prices
  - Highly influenced by network configuration (discretion of the analyst) and therefore
    - Not transparent or replicable
    - open to industry criticism.
  - Prices no longer reflect costs incurred so not appropriate for Exit
    - Not an issue for Entry reserve prices under the Licence but what about the EU Regulations?)
- Transportation Model approach used previously for Electricity Transmission
  - Reduced line lengths (75%) were included in the Electricity TM to represent spare capacity in the south west – but removed as part of BETTA.
  - Reduction arbitrary and identification of lines to reduce is either arbitrary or involves complex network analysis hence
    - Not transparent or replicable
    - open to industry criticism.



## **Spare Entry Capacity**

- What is Spare Entry Capacity?
  - Un-utilised Entry Capacity at an ASEP?
    - We don't know this until after the day and hence is of no value in regard to forward charge setting
  - Baseline Entry Capacity less forecast entry flows?
    - This was the GCM06 proposal which was vetoed
    - Only way to take into account 'spare capacity' in investment timescales
    - Forecasting becomes contentious
    - Potentially undermines TBE
  - Unsold Obligated Entry Capacity?
    - This is what we sell in every auction at every ASEP

### **Forecast Loop**





### **Forecast Loop Outcome**

- Success Increased 'Spare' Capacity Sales
  - Discounts for additional capacity
  - ...but discounts for capacity that would otherwise have been sold
  - ... new sales would need to outweigh discount otherwise
  - ...cross subsidy from other Users

- Failure No increase in 'Spare' Capacity Sales
  - Discounts for capacity that would otherwise have been sold
  - ... cross subsidy from other Users

- Capacity utilised is in excess of the forecast
- ...the forecast is incorrect

- Capacity utilised similar to the forecast
- ...the forecast is viewed as being correct




## **Spare Capacity Conclusion**

- We have not identified a useful forward looking definition of Spare Capacity for charge setting purposes other than that based on a forecast
  - Proposing using forecasts in the charging model led to accusations of manipulation and pollution of the TBE process and unstable pricing
  - GCM06 did not gain support from the industry for this reason
- Should we be focusing on incentivising the use of existing capacity within investment time scales?
  - i.e. obligated entry capacity ~ P0 QSEC prices
- We must be mindful that any capacity discounts will lead to TO Entry Commodity increases unless new sales outweigh the discounts


## **QSEC P0 Options**

- P0 prices are currently set using the Transportation Model with the relevant entry point at the obligated level
  - 10% Discount
    - We only offer 90% of the obligated level in the QSEC hence we could reduce to this level which would reduce prices
    - P1 to P20 prices would be unaffected
  - Other
    - Views?

### Impact on 2007 QSEC P0 Prices



### Impact on 2007 QSEC P0 Prices - Beach



### **Consultation Options**

Discussion followed by Consultation

 Draft Consultation for comment followed by Consultation

Straight to Consultation

Views?